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All errors of fact and judgment are exclusively mine.
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND SPECIAL TERMS
USED IN TEXT

banya public steam bathhouse
Comintern Communist International
Detsgiz Children’s Publishing House
GAKO Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Kirovskoi oblasti—State Archive of the Kirov Region
GARF Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiiskoi Federatsii—State Archive of the Russian Federation
GASPI KO Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii Kirovskoi oblasti—State Archive of the Social and Political History of the Kirov Region
Gosplan State Planning Committee
IRA Iaranskii raionnyi arkhiv—Iaransk District Archive
Iskozh Kirov’s Artificial Leather Combine
Komsomol Young Communist League
NA RAO Nauchnyi arkhiv Rossiskoi akademii obrazovaniia—Archive of the Russian Academy of Education
NKVD Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The acronym is often used to refer to the security police.
RGAE Rossiiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki—Russian State Archive of the Economy
RGANI Rossiiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishe i istorii—Russian State Archive of Contemporary History
RGASPI Rossiiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii—Russian State Archive of Social and Political History
soviet a governing council
Sovnarkom Council of Peoples Commissars
TETs No. 1 power plant in the city of Kirov
Viatlag concentration camp in the Kirov region
STALIN’S
WORLD WAR II
EVACUATIONS
City Center, Kirov, Early 1940s

1. Artificial Leather Combine
2. Tire Factory
3. Factory No. 38
4. Prison, Cord Plant
5. Narkompros Headquarters
6. Dynamo Stadium
7. Theater Square, Drama Theater
8. Herzen State Public Library
9. Revolution Square
10. Narkomles Headquarters

Factory No. 266 and Factory No. 32 are not shown. They were located farther to the northwest.
INTRODUCTION

This book examines Soviet evacuation during World War II with a focus on the Kirov region. It assesses the response of Kirov's citizens and their governing organs to the sudden influx there of people, institutions, and industrial enterprises. After initially welcoming these newcomers in their midst, Kirov's own soon resented the hardships that the central government and evacuation required of them. They became ever more vocal as realization grew that the war would be a prolonged one and when, from their perspective, evacuees inappropriately demanded privileged treatment. As Kirov and Moscow pursued their respective agendas for evacuation, sometimes in concert but increasingly at cross-purposes, they exposed preexisting and highly dysfunctional dimensions of Soviet governance at the center and at the periphery.

THE LONG REACH OF LOCAL HISTORY

Historians like to say that all history is local and personal. For many of us, regional and local study has indeed become the venue of choice. We have found that a sharp focus on an area and the attendant depth of analysis that follows have encouraged the development of themes relevant to a larger temporal and spatial order. The genre has recently taken on considerable life with expanded access to provincial archives in the former USSR. I have discussed elsewhere the scholarship on one or more regions by Donald Raleigh, J. Arch Getty, Jörg Baberowski, Stephen Kotkin, James Hughes, James Harris, Youngok Kang-Bohr, Karl Qualls, and I. E. Smirnova, among others. Their work has contributed to a deeper appreciation of the 1917 revolution, governance, industrialization, collectivization, and the terror.¹ Many other regional studies have also helped refashion the grand narrative of Russian and Soviet history.

Five examinations of nineteenth-century Russia are a case in point. In a study of peasant Orthodoxy in Voronezh province, Chris Chulos found
that pilgrimages to local shrines attracted participants from other areas and thereby reinforced a sense of “a larger community of Orthodox believers.” As peasants developed this “new identity as Russian nationals,” they increasingly used their religious beliefs to question policies of the Russian state and the Orthodox church bureaucracy. In a monograph on Tver’ province from 1820 to 1860, Mary Cavender discovered a nobility that cared deeply about their local estates and province. Not an attachment to Moscow or to St. Petersburg but rather an emotional commitment to their region’s life and people shaped the cultural identity of this nobility. Similarly, Catherine Evtuhov’s more recent study of the Nizhnii Novgorod province found that in the 1800s its nobility, among others, fashioned the “provincial idea.” They articulated “a local culture rooted in the provincial press, natural history museums, archival organization, jubilee celebrations, and the construction of a local historical narrative.” Organs of self-government, the zemstvos, first created in the 1860s, won the trust of a wide range of the area’s population. In an examination of a serf estate in Iaroslavl’ province, Tracy Dennison discovered a highly stratified peasant community with many of its members actively involved in local land, labor, and money markets. Katherine Pickering Antonova’s study of a middling gentry family in Vladimir province revealed an intriguing set of gendered roles. It was the wife, Natalia, who supervised the estate, issued orders to serfs, and kept accounts. The husband, Andrei, tutored the children, engaged in extensive correspondence, and wrote articles. They and by extension, the author suggests, many others in the Russian Empire regarded these roles as constituent parts of a divinely ordained order, one that made their provincial world rich and fulfilling.

Other regional studies have revised our understanding of twentieth-century Russia and the Soviet Union. In a study of Kazan and Nizhnii Novgorod provinces in 1917, Sarah Badcock found that the daily needs and demands of ordinary people frequently overwhelmed a larger narrative of democratization and enlightenment that the Provisional Government and intelligentsia wished to write for the nation as a whole. Tracy McDonald’s recent examination of Riazan province during the 1920s underscored the importance of friendship and kinship networks that made local officials more responsive to peasant interests than to Moscow’s commands. Yoram Gorlizki’s focus on the leadership in Riazan and Kirov provinces in 1959 and 1960 demonstrated the importance of a regional party boss’s personal-
ity and relationship with local party secretaries. In Kirov’s case, a provincial party secretary’s harsh treatment of his subordinates prevented, ironically, the kind of massive forgery of yields of meat that occurred in Riazan province, where a more likable first secretary ruled.9

We know more about the terror in the Soviet Union in the 1930s thanks in part to the study of local and regional history. Wendy Goldman’s “microhistory of the terror,” a case study of the party records of five factories in Moscow, brought personality and drama to a subject long of interest to her. Moving seamlessly from a description of the behavior of one individual to that of another, Goldman portrayed party organizations as “a snake pit of mutual informers, a citizenry capable of destroying its own.”10 A Russian publication on the terror, Stalinism in the Soviet Provinces, 1937–1938, demonstrated differences from region to region as officials used the terror to address local issues and settle personal scores.11

Regional history has, to be sure, its potential pitfalls as well as merits. In a review of historical scholarship on the Soviet Union, Catriona Kelly spoke of a natural tension between a history that is intently focused on a particular area and a larger, more encompassing view that is often the product of schema and models of the social sciences. She asked, “How do we mediate between the proliferation of detailed research and local case studies, on the one hand, and the preference of general readers (and students) for narratives that are not ‘messy’ and speak to big issues, on the other?”12 It is an appropriate question. In the preface to her work on serfdom, Dennison acknowledged that her book “has nothing of the sublimity of theory. Instead it takes a worm’s eye view of institutions, looking at them through the eyes of provincial villagers in all their boring drudgery and everyday concerns.”13 Badcock suggested that her study of two provinces in 1917 would “highlight the confusion and precision of power relations and social interactions in 1917 rather than offer conclusive answers and clear models.”14 Yet Kelly, Dennison, and Badcock know well that the contrast between the “local” and the “grand” is not necessarily so stark and uncompromising. “It is not what,” the historian Sergei Mikhailovich Kashtanov has suggested, “but how something is examined that makes any subject, including a regional study, transcend antiquarian interest.”15

Even before Gorlizki’s aforementioned study, the Kirov region attracted considerable scholarly interest. In an examination of the province (called Viatka before 1934) from 1914 to 1922, Aaron Retish found over and again
that the peasantry and state organs engaged in a mutual give-and-take. In
1917 and thereafter, peasants employed the state in reasserting the impor-
tance of the commune and in resolving disputes among themselves. Yet at
the same time, whole villages resisted state initiatives for the requisitioning
of their grain. As peasants and state jostled, negotiated, and accommo-
dated each other, peasants gradually came to see themselves “as citizens of
the Soviet state” and as “part of the Soviet state-building project.”16

My monograph Grand Theater: Regional Governance in Stalin’s Russia, 1931–
1941 (2009) also focused on the Viatka-Kirov region.17 There I examined
Soviet bureaucracy not as a structure but as a process of governance. That
process included how the local and regional apparatus responded to per-
ceived successes and failures of national policy, chose to produce, share,
and conceal information, and reacted when common citizens injected
themselves into governance by submitting demands and complaints. I
found that Soviet administrative practice more often than not had negative
consequences for both the governed and governing, a scenario that pre-
vailed well beyond, it is suggested, Kirov. This study, Stalin’s World War II
Evacuations, returns to that region to examine the relationship of the center
and periphery when they literally came face-to-face with wartime evacua-
tion of people and institutions to Kirov.

COMPETING NARRATIVES

Soviet evacuation during World War II became a subject of intense inter-
est, first during the war among journalists and then, after it, among his-
torians. Devastating Soviet defeats ended a faith in the inviolability of the
USSR’s territory and invincibility of its armed forces. Yet as that belief dissi-
pated, a triumphalist creed took its place. Kirov’s regional daily, Kirovskaia
pravda, and the region’s many district newspapers reported over and over
again that Soviet citizens set aside their personal needs as they rushed to
the aid of each other and to the defense of the fatherland. That version of
events, though exaggerated, contained fundamental truths about the home
front. In the Kirov region, as elsewhere, people collected warm clothing for
soldiers; donated labor, funds, and blood; repaired garments and footwear
for the troops and evacuees; and participated in voluntary workdays. Local
soviets and collective farms provided newcomers with food free of charge
or at low prices. Women mended curtains, bed linen, and underwear for
military hospitals, and children provided free concerts for the wounded.18
That triumphalist narrative has dominated postwar Soviet and Russian versions of wartime evacuation. In 1984, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, deputy chair of the USSR’s Council of Peoples Commissars (Sovnarkom) during World War II, recalled that “we succeeded in relocating to the rear virtually an entire industrial country.” Upon adding that the nation had also evacuated millions of people, Molotov proudly asserted, “Where else would this have been possible?” When interviewed in May 1975, Mikhail Georgievich Pervukhin, deputy chair of the Evacuation Council, the center’s body responsible for organizing and directing people, institutions, and factories away from the front, declared that evacuation had been “one of the greatest feats of the war.” It was an achievement, he insisted, without “any analogue in world history, in the history of warfare. It is impossible not to be amazed at how we were able to complete so successfully such a grandiose and, I would say, unbelievably difficult task.” The historian Georgii Aleksandrovich Kumanev, who interviewed both Molotov and Pervukhin, agreed: “Evacuation carried out in the USSR in just the first months of the Great Patriotic War was unprecedented in its scale and speed.”

Molotov, Pervukhin, Kumanev, and like-minded narrators have fashioned a tale in which state and society generously accommodated evacuated institutions and factories and, as Kirov’s newspapers insisted, provided food, clothing, and shelter for newcomers. A book on Leningrad’s institutions and people in evacuation likewise concluded that everywhere local organs of power received evacuees in “a most warm and deferential manner.” Despite severe shortages in Kazan, the city’s soviet and university made the relocated Academy of Sciences feel at home. Drama theaters everywhere enjoyed the best facilities in their new locations.

Kirov was reputedly no less generous than other regions. On May 9, 2012, the governor of the Kirov region, Nikita Iur’evich Belykh, bestowed on Kirov the title “City of Glorious Labor” (Gorod trudovoi slavy), for its efforts during the war that included a heartfelt welcome of evacuees. In celebrating the honor, the municipality published a massive and amply illustrated three-volume work, The City That Forged Victory: Kirov in the Years of the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945. Its initial volume featured an entire section on evacuation, recounting in triumphalist tones how Kirov’s governing organs and people embraced their latest guests.

However appealing that narrative for Kirov and the nation, several Soviet and Russian historians have departed from it. An anonymous contributor

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sounded a dissentient note in the 1994 volume *They Fought, Worked, and Studied: Leningrad’s Higher Educational Institutions during the War and Blockade*. In Tashkent, the capital of the Soviet Union’s republic of Uzbekistan, local leaders resisted the demands from the evacuated Leningrad Polytechnic Institute for classrooms, living quarters, and material assistance. The Institute’s appeals to Aleksei Nikolaevich Kosygin, deputy chair of the USSR’s Sovnarkom, and to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, chair of the Presidium of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet, brought little satisfaction.\(^{28}\) An examination of the evacuation of collections from Leningrad’s Hermitage Museum found that boxes filled with the museum’s cultural treasures had been stacked up, one on top of the other, in three unsuitable buildings in Sverdlovsk. The museum’s staff had hoped to move items out of at least one of the facilities, the Picture Gallery, to a more fitting structure nearby. The municipal official responsible for public buildings refused to approve the transfer, believing that the desired destination was too good to serve, as he put it, as a warehouse.\(^{29}\)

Several studies of evacuation to the Urals region have sounded a critical note. In a study published in 2002, Marina Nikolaevna Potemkina, while providing an overall positive assessment, acknowledged problems associated with the transportation of evacuees and the financing of evacuation centers along their route of travel. At their destination, newcomers experienced shortages of food, inadequate medical services, and negative attitudes toward them on the part of the local population (including prejudice directed toward Jews and Estonians).\(^{30}\) In a study of the city of Sverdlovsk, where in the early 1940s every tenth inhabitant was an evacuee, Gennadii Egorovich Kornilov found that the city’s officials failed to provide new arrivals with sufficient housing, food, and clothing. The municipality had, to be sure, inadequate resources at its disposal. But officials added to evacuees’ woes with the assumption that it was not the city’s job to provide them with “ideal” conditions.\(^{31}\) In a 1995 study based largely on an examination in Kirov of security police (NKVD) records from the period, materials now largely inaccessible to historians, Valerii Egorovich Musikhin discovered a growing dismay among local citizens with the government’s alleged privileged treatment of evacuees.\(^{32}\)

As with Russian scholarship, Western historical literature has interpreted evacuation in various ways. Mark Harrison concluded that “from one point of view, [it] was a messy, unplanned operation which incurred
substantial inefficiency costs, [but] from another viewpoint the important thing is that the evacuation was an imaginative stroke of policy which worked.” Sanford Lieberman found that evacuation and a rapid return to production of factories amounted to a victory “on the industrial front.” The Kremlin’s concentration of power, Lieberman suggested, made it possible to impose and carry out an evacuation that was essential to the nation’s very existence.

Two recent books by American scholars on wartime evacuation to Tashkent take a more critical view. Rebecca Manley’s monograph To the Tashkent Station and Paul Stronski’s Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930–1966 capture well the chaos and desperation accompanying the relocation of a large number of people and the complex, often strained, relationship between the local population and evacuees. While some Uzbeks fostered and adopted orphaned newcomers, cases celebrated in the local press, other people, as Manley demonstrates in considerable detail, adopted a different attitude. Local citizens charged new arrivals exorbitant rents. Many Uzbeks regarded evacuees as Jews and responded with anti-Semitic slurs and threats, even an occasional murder. While neither Manley nor Stronski focused on the response by party and state organs, they did mention that local government treated newcomers as marginals and withheld rations guaranteed them by the state. An examination by Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie Page Moch of the larger topic of migration in twentieth-century Russia found, when turning to Soviet wartime evacuation, considerable resistance locally to the center’s dictate to provide evacuees with resources already in short supply.

It is this more critical view that dominates this monograph, Stalin’s World War II Evacuations. It focuses intently and in detail on the evolving response from a warm welcome to open hostility by a Soviet region’s people and its government toward evacuees and evacuated institutions during World War II.

**sources**

Archives in Moscow and Kirov contain an abundance of documents on evacuation. Moscow’s State Archive of the Russian Federation holds records of the government’s Evacuation Council. That same archive contains the extensive correspondence of several deputy chairs of the USSR’s Sovnarkom who were involved in controversies surrounding the evacuation of factories to Kirov. It also possesses documentation on life in Kirov as
experienced by the Russian Republic’s Commissariat of Education (Narkompros).\textsuperscript{40} Moscow’s Russian State Archive of the Economy houses materials of the USSR’s Commissariat of Forest Industry (Narkomles) during its time in Kirov and the records of other commissariats with jurisdiction over industrial enterprises that relocated there.\textsuperscript{41}

The State Archive for the Social and Political History of the Kirov Region contains multiple reports from inspectors of the Regional Party Committee and Kirov’s Party Control Commission on evacuation and Kirov’s response to it.\textsuperscript{42} Records of Kirov’s administrative organs responsible for evacuation are at the State Archive of the Kirov Region.\textsuperscript{43} “Books of Commands,” a chronological compilation of orders handwritten by directors of the region’s two major evacuation centers, are there as well.

One evacuated institution for children generated considerable documentation. In 1941, Spanish Orphanage No. 10, consisting of children brought from Spain in the late 1930s, moved from the Leningrad region to the town of Molotovsk in the Kirov province. It remained there until mid-1944. Moscow’s State Archive of the Russian Federation contains a wealth of information on the orphanage: reports by and about it, the “Book of Commands” by its director, and the minutes of sessions of its pedagogical council that were attended by administrators and teachers.\textsuperscript{44} Kirov’s provincial archives have preserved the orphanage’s multiple reports to the Molotovsk district’s party committee and to Kirov’s Regional Party Committee. They also contain reports from the Regional Committee’s inspectors and from investigators sent to the orphanage by a host of other agencies. Those same archives in Moscow and Kirov have on hand the deliberations about the orphanage by Narkompros, the Schools Department of the party’s Central Committee, Kirov’s Regional Party Committee, and the Molotovsk district’s party committee.

I interviewed several individuals who as children lived in the Kirov region during the war, some of whom initially came to the area as evacuees. Their life was difficult; hunger was their constant companion. Yet no one wanted to dwell for long on their own travails. They were aware then, as now, that their compatriots, and not just those at the front, often had it far worse. My interviewees who were not evacuees harbored, they said, no resentment toward the newcomers, even when the latter admittedly received special treatment. As we will see in the following pages, not everyone in the Kirov
region, including some people holding high office, held such an agreeable attitude toward new arrivals.

Occasionally, an interview took a serendipitous turn. In October 2009, I traveled to Nolinsk (Molotovsk from 1940 to 1957) to interview Viktor Sergeevich Putintsev. As expected, he recalled the children in the town’s Spanish orphanage. He then produced an album compiled in the late 1950s by a local schoolteacher and his students on the history of the local secondary school. Its first section, “Spain’s Children in Our School,” contained photographs of and reminiscences from these youths.

*Kirovskaia pravda*, a publication of the Regional Party Committee, and the region’s district newspapers, each the party’s press arm in one of the more than fifty districts of the province, wrote extensively about evacuation. I found these newspapers primarily useful for their triumphalist coverage of Kirov’s response. It must be said, however, that newspapers spoke primarily about events at the front, especially once the Red Army took the offensive, and about the contributions to the war effort by industrial workers and peasants. Yet on all subjects less was printed as the war wore on. Mobilization of human and material resources for the armed forces and for defense factories left editors with precious few material and human resources to publish newspapers with their previous frequency and bulk. *Kirovskaia pravda* went from six issues a week, usually with four pages each, to three issues of three pages each. District newspapers underwent a similar contraction.

A national passion for remembering the war combined with a fascination for local history has led to the writing of many memoirs. Kirov’s Herzen State Public Library contains an ample number of such items that have been published. Other valuable but unpublished reminiscences may be found there and in Kirov’s archives, the Collections Department of Kirov’s Regional Museum, and the Museum of Kirov’s Pirelli Tire Plant.

**Kirov’s Location**

Because of its northern location, Kirov is cold and dark throughout the winter and much of the late fall and early spring. The heating season begins no later than early October and extends into May. From November through March, the city’s average temperature hovers around 13 degrees Fahrenheit (minus 10.6 Celsius) with direct sunlight limited to only a few hours a day,
the sun, when visible, hanging just above the southern horizon. Such conditions placed a great demand on resources for heating (chiefly firewood) and for illumination from electricity to kerosene, all woefully in short supply during the war.

**TERMS AND LABELS**

I have largely adhered to the Soviet custom of labeling citizens who fled the front during World War II as “evacuees” (evakuirovanny) rather than “refugees” (bezhentsy). At that time, “evacuee” implied “ours,” that is, a Soviet citizen, departing areas overrun or threatened by invading forces. “Refugee” often connoted “other,” perhaps a foreigner, seeking temporary safety. Nevertheless, to avoid stylistic monotony, I have occasionally used “refugee” to mean “evacuee.” I am not alone in using the terms interchangeably. In late November 1941, Kalinin preferred the term “refugee” in his article “What Does It Mean These Days to Be a Soviet Patriot,” published by the newspaper Volzhskaja kommuna, and subsequently reprinted widely in other newspapers and in pamphlet form. There he called upon collective farms to do everything possible for the welfare of refugees.45 Several Russian historians have employed both terms, “evacuee” and “refugee,” but with subtle distinction. For them, “evacuee” usually has meant a newcomer who was officially registered before and upon arrival in a new location. A “refugee” came without any prior notice (and might avoid registration thereafter).46

I consistently use “orphanage” for the Russian detskii dom, which literally translated would be “children’s home.” Orphanages housed children without parents as well as youngsters with one or both parents living. The adults might not have evacuated with their children or they worked long hours and could not care for multiple offspring at home.

The Molotov district in the city of Kirov should not be confused with the town of Molotovsk. Nor should it be confused with the Molotov region (named Perm’ before 1940 and after 1957).

The executive committee of Kirov’s Municipal Soviet or Regional Soviet often spoke for the soviet. For the sake of stylistic brevity, I usually refer to the soviet rather than to its executive committee. For the same reason, I refer to the Regional Party Committee, when it was the committee’s bureau that represented the larger body.
Reorganization of materials at the State Archive for the Social and Political History of the Kirov Region is an ongoing process. Some of the items cited in the chapters that follow have been subsequently rearranged and are now located in different folders or in the same folder but with altered pagination. The archive provides a key that allows for easy negotiation of these changes.

I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system with several exceptions. Some places and proper names are rendered as they usually appear in English. In the reference notes, I use the following abbreviations when citing Russian archival materials: f. for collection (fond), op. for inventory (opis’), d. for file or folder (delo), l. and ll. for folio and folios (list and listy), and ob. for verso (oborot).

STRUCTURE

Chapter 1 takes measure of the immensity of Soviet evacuation of factories, government organs, and people. It then puts that discussion in the larger context of forced displacement of populations in modern history. States and their citizens usually lacked the resources and the will to care for the displaced during their transit and, for those who survived the trip, at their destination. This chapter then focuses on the forced relocation of people in the Soviet Union that accompanied dekulakization in the early 1930s and the ethnic cleansing that followed later that decade and during World War II. Finally, it discusses the Viatka-Kirov region as a source and destination for people on the move well before 1941.

During World War II, Soviet evacuees suffered incredibly. Yet, as the second chapter illustrates, almost everyone in the USSR endured the most trying of conditions at work and at home. In urban areas, the level of public services, hardly adequate before the war, deteriorated, turning towns in the Kirov region into cold, dark, and smelly places.

Chapter 3 first discusses the Soviet government’s good intentions to regulate the flow of evacuation and to assist evacuees. The enemy’s rapid advance and the sheer number of institutions, factories, and people on the move overwhelmed the effort nationally. This chapter then focuses on the deluge of newcomers descending on the city and region of Kirov. It discusses, in particular, the arrival of two commissariats from Moscow, Nar- kompros and Narkomles, three major defense plants (factories No. 32,
38, and 266), the orphanage for Spanish children, and wounded soldiers assigned to the region’s military hospitals. It also examines the activity of evacuation centers in the region.

As chapter 4 demonstrates, Kirov’s state and party organs initially provided incoming institutions with prime facilities and individual evacuees with food, clothing, shelter, and monetary grants. And yet despite these measures, most newcomers lived no better, often worse, than everyone else in the region, as the following chapter makes clear.

Chapter 5 describes in detail the conditions in which workers at the aforementioned three evacuated defense plants lived and worked. It also discusses the difficulties experienced by several higher educational institutions arriving from Moscow and the shortages of almost everything imaginable at the region’s military hospitals and at orphanages for evacuated children (the Spanish orphanage excepted).

Initial generosity of Kirov’s citizens and government drew upon a belief that their sacrifice for the benefit of newcomers would be, like presumably the war itself, brief. Chapter 6 discusses a change in attitude as it became apparent that evacuation would be anything but a quick fix. Residents and administrators began to begrudge the real and imagined privileges accorded evacuees and imperious behavior by some of the new arrivals. Local and regional officials responded impatiently, sometimes petulantly, to claims of mistreatment made by evacuees and by those bureaucrats outside the region who interceded on complainants’ behalf.

As chapter 7 makes clear, Narkompros and Narkomles provoked considerable displeasure by their aggressive demands for food, fuel, and space. Narkompros aroused additional resentment, when its inspectors embellished the failures of Kirov’s schools and orphanages with little recognition of the difficulties confronting educators and children. The Regional Department of Education and Regional Party Committee countered in kind with criticism, some of it petty, of the Spanish orphanage, a prized institution once beyond reproach. This chapter also discusses how Narkomles’s requisitioning of buildings brought it into conflict with another evacuated institution, Factory No. 38, and with Kirov’s Pedagogical Institute.

Chapter 8 discusses the effort by the Pedagogical Institute, supported by Kirov’s Regional Soviet and Party Committee, to wrest from Narkomles reparations for damage inflicted on the Institute’s property. It also focuses on conflict over territory between an evacuated tire plant, on the one hand,
and the regional police administration and a local artificial leather factory, on the other. These disputes were significant and loud enough to prompt the intervention of the USSR’s Council of Peoples Commissars. This chapter also examines the orchestrated effort by Kirov’s municipal and regional organs, already apparent in 1941, to evict evacuees and their institutions from prime facilities in the city of Kirov.