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Republicans
and Race
Introduction

Three weeks before he was officially nominated as the Republican presidential candidate in 2000, George W. Bush addressed the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Knowing he faced a hostile audience (in 1983 its delegates had booed and hissed when his father insisted that Republican policies benefited African Americans), Bush sought to disarm the crowd with humor, quipping that he had “a couple, maybe more than a couple” supporters among them. He then turned more serious and confessed that the “party of [Abraham] Lincoln has not always carried the mantle of Lincoln.” But, the Texan insisted, the future could be different. He agreed that racism remained a serious national problem, pledged to vigorously enforce civil rights laws, and called for education reform, greater health care access, more home ownership, and help for religious organizations that assisted “the suffering and hurting.” A deeply religious man, Bush affirmed that the state should help the destitute but also insisted that such people “need[ed] what no government can provide, the power of compassion and prayer and love.” Audience members remained leery. One, who had not voted for a Republican presidential candidate in nearly half a century, deemed Bush’s ideas “a step in the right direction” but then observed, “Face it, they haven’t done anything for us.”

In contrast, the NAACP delegates warmly welcomed Bush’s Democratic opponent, Vice President Albert Gore Jr., three days later. They cheered when Gore proclaimed himself a member of their organization and reeled off a list of federal policy prescriptions that included supporting affirmative action, protecting Social Security and Medicare from budget cuts, curbing racial profiling by law enforcement officers, and fostering economic development. Gore contrasted his religious views with Bush’s by declaring that a person expresses faith through action,
not rhetoric. Results, he argued, matter more than good intentions. The NAACP delegates’ divergent responses to the two candidates foreshadowed Bush’s winning a paltry 9 percent of the black vote in the November election.2

That 91 percent of black voters cast their ballots for Gore is evidence that nothing separates the American electorate more than race. Black loyalty to the Democratic Party remains high across age, class, gender, national origin, and other demographic characteristics. Republican voters, in contrast, are overwhelmingly white. Since 1964, no Republican presidential candidate has attracted more than 15 percent of the black vote.3

Two narratives dominate contemporary discussions of African Americans and the Republican Party. One stresses that during the mid-1960s and early 1970s, Republicans consciously abandoned their identity as the pro–civil rights “party of Lincoln” to woo whites, especially in the South, who were eager to preserve their political, economic, and social power in the face of challenges from the civil rights movement and federal authorities. In this view, race has played a decisive role in the nation’s conservative turn since the late 1960s. A second interpretation, usually offered by Republicans themselves or by conservative activists, denies any transformation. Proponents of this view uphold the GOP as fighting to desegregate the South and protect black voting rights. They contend it was the Democratic Party that stood in the way of racial progress during the mid-twentieth century and continues to offer policies that harm black families and communities.4

I offer a fresh look at the relationship between African Americans and the GOP. This book explores how Republicans at the federal level approached racial policy and politics between 1945 and 1974. Though the struggle for black equality existed before then and continues today, these three decades constitute a distinct era in that battle. African Americans and their allies grew more assertive in challenging the status quo. Some focused on direct action protests, while others primarily lobbied the federal government. Civil rights reformers demanded changes in economics, segregation, voting, housing, and other matters. Their struggle encompassed the entire nation, not just the South. The most prominent and influential reformers focused on removing racial distinctions from the law—they fought for a “color-blind” society.
The mid-1970s marked another turning point. Important legal victories had been achieved. Direct action subsided, as did the large-scale racial violence that had been so common in the second half of the 1960s. Controversies over whether the federal government would force the integration of suburban and urban schools and launch a massive new antipoverty initiative receded. Most important, civil rights activists now championed “race-conscious” remedies for inequality. Though such thinking had been present in the earlier period, it took a backseat to universalist ideas that emphasized a common humanity. Celebrations of “diversity” began to supplant the “color-blind” model.  

Between 1945 and 1974, Republicans exerted considerable influence over the timing and content of racial policy. The GOP's impact was evident at the White House, where Dwight Eisenhower and later Richard Nixon made important decisions. It was also at work in Congress. By focusing heavily on Congress, I aim to bring greater balance to a narrative that has placed presidents and presidential contenders at center stage.

Republicans’ involvement differed from that portrayed by the two dominant narratives. They were not steadfast supporters of civil rights reforms prior to 1964. To be sure, Republicans did not speak with one voice, and at crucial moments they aligned with the NAACP and other prominent black leaders. More often than not, however, they were at loggerheads. Most Republicans opposed the reformers’ agenda or were uninterested in race altogether. They usually saw little political advantage in pressing for change. Their understanding of race, the role of the state, and American society was fundamentally different from that of most African Americans. Like their nineteenth-century forebears, Republicans proved effective at minimizing the reach of federal authority into racial matters outside the South—or preventing it altogether. The reforms they did support applied almost exclusively to Dixie.

Scholars who emphasize a sharp turn to the right after 1964 ignore or trivialize significant policy developments. During the early 1970s, civil rights activists felt embattled and dejected. Their differences with the GOP remained substantial, and policy clashes were frequently acrimonious. Nevertheless, Republicans, especially those in the Senate, proved crucial to fending off attempts by conservatives (usually southerners) in
both parties to roll back reforms regarding education, voting, and employment. The Nixon administration launched several notable initiatives. Republicans supported measures their predecessors had rejected or never would have favored. The reform impulse of the 1960s survived and was expanded on. The GOP adapted to a racial context different from that which had existed in earlier decades. The early 1970s offer an important reminder that shifts in party control of the White House do not necessarily mean policy changes and that developments in Congress matter as much as, if not more than, presidential politics.

I also explore the role race played in Republican politics. The GOP remained the minority party throughout the period covered in this book. During the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats built a coalition of white southerners, factory workers outside the South, intellectuals, and African Americans. These diverse groups often quarreled, but their loyalty on Election Day meant that Democrats controlled both houses of Congress for almost the entire era covered in this book and held the White House for much of it. The GOP thus had to find new voters if it wanted to regain the dominance it had enjoyed before the New Deal.

For thirty years, race played a prominent role in intraparty debates over how to do that. Some Republicans favored allying more closely with the civil rights movement as a means of rallying support from whites and blacks alike. Others considered that approach futile if not counterproductive. The latter faction usually prevailed. Liberal Republicans were small in number and wielded minimal influence over the party’s direction. The GOP usually paid little or no political price for—and indeed, benefited from—its lack of African American supporters. Between 1945 and 1974, civil rights leaders’ recurring claims that blacks constituted the “balance of power” on Election Day often proved greatly exaggerated.

This book is about men who held or sought power and how they dealt with racial issues from those positions of influence. It speaks to two important topics in post–World War II American history: the struggle for racial justice, and the development of the Republican Party. The Republican Party shaped the modern African American freedom struggle. That fight also transformed the GOP.
On February 4, 1945, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet general secretary Joseph Stalin convened in Yalta. With victory against Germany and Italy imminent, they had gathered to make plans for the political and economic future of Europe.¹

The degree to which government would shape the postwar order stood at the center of domestic politics too. Roosevelt’s New Deal had expanded federal authority over economic activities. Though many Americans despised the president, millions adored him and believed the New Deal had created a more just society. African Americans were among the latter. The New Deal reinforced and expanded racial discrimination, but it also brought jobs, education, improvements in health, and attention from prominent members of the administration. African Americans saw the federal government as a positive force.

As blacks looked ahead to the postwar era, they believed further assistance from Washington would be necessary for economic opportunities, voting rights, and protection from violence. They would be sorely disappointed. Southern Democrats, who wielded considerable power in Congress, continued to block federal efforts for racial change. So, too, did Republicans, who viewed the world very differently from African Americans and felt no compelling reason to woo black voters.
The Battle for Fair Employment Legislation

The day after Roosevelt arrived in Yalta, Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) introduced a bill to create a federal fair employment practices commission (FEPC). This five-member body would investigate individual complaints of job discrimination, establish regional committees, undertake studies, and work with employers and labor unions to ensure that race, ethnicity, and religion would not be factors in hiring, firing, compensation, and other decisions. The commission would have no enforcement powers; it would rely on persuasion and negotiation. In the parlance of the day, it was known as a “voluntary” commission. Because discrimination might well function differently in various parts of the country, Taft argued, solutions should vary accordingly. The first step was to study those regional differences.2

Taft’s words and actions commanded attention. The son of former president William Howard Taft, he had graduated first in his class at Yale and then at Harvard Law School. He had been elected to the Senate in 1938 and quickly became the leader of the conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans, formed in opposition to the New Deal. As far as Taft was concerned, the United States was already well down the road to socialism. Government officials were exerting influence over wages, prices, and other matters that should be reserved for business executives and markets.3

The senator found the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) particularly troublesome. Created in 1935, the NLRB had the authority to protect workers’ right to join unions and thereby engage in collective bargaining with employers. It helped facilitate a dramatic rise in union membership. By the mid-1940s, unions had negotiated wages, benefits, and work rules that previous generations of laborers and managers would have found unimaginable. Most union members saw the federal government as their ally and credited the Democrats for these gains. Most business leaders, in contrast, detested the NLRB and unions. They wanted to set the terms of employment, and they believed that unions encouraged workers to see their bosses as greedy adversaries rather than benevolent allies. In management’s eyes, class conflict had, with government assistance, replaced the harmonious labor relations of earlier eras.
Business leaders wanted to hold labor’s power in check or roll it back to pre–New Deal levels.⁴

Given Taft’s opposition to federal involvement in labor affairs, his sponsorship of FEPC legislation appeared to be a contradiction, but the senator thought otherwise. “In many places, [African Americans] are the last to be employed and the first to be laid off,” he acknowledged. “Custom and prejudice interfere with improvement in their position.” Taft believed discrimination constituted an artificial barrier that could keep an individual from making the most of his or her abilities.⁵

Taft’s bill reflected recent trends. World War II had made race a prominent issue in public discussion and popular culture. American propaganda countered Nazi theories of white supremacy by highlighting themes such as democracy, equality, and opportunity. Universalist ideas, which aimed to replace a belief in racial hierarchy with a standard of law and custom that emphasized a common humanity, had gained strength. Taft’s committee resembled the many state and local agencies created during the war to foster harmonious intergroup relations. These bodies typically appealed to conscience and morality while arguing that prejudice was un-American. Several states in the North and West were even considering some sort of antidiscrimination employment policy. Finally, Taft’s legislation grew out of developments in management. Many corporations continued to refuse to hire blacks and other minorities or relegated them to the least desirable, lowest-paying work; they often justified their actions by citing concerns that white employees might engage in violence or other work disruptions rather than accept black coworkers. Yet business executives were not monolithic. Wartime rhetoric, as well as labor shortages and pressure from civil rights activists, had led some to seek expanded opportunities for African Americans. Business leaders wanted to control this process.⁶

Taft hoped to preserve that autonomy by heading off “compulsory” FEPC legislation. Although voluntary and compulsory FEPC models shared several characteristics, they differed regarding enforcement. If a compulsory FEPC found evidence of discrimination, it could, like the NLRB, issue a cease-and-desist order enforceable by a federal court, thus compelling businesses and unions to change their behavior. Penalties for noncompliance might include fines or the mandatory hiring or
promotion of the individual who had filed the complaint (perhaps with back pay), or some other affirmative step.

Compulsory FEPC advocates distinguished between prejudice and discrimination. Government could not force an individual to hold particular beliefs (prejudice), but it could, through the threat of punishment, prevent him or her from acting on those beliefs (discrimination). According to Congresswoman Mary Norton (D-N.J.), a sponsor of compulsory FEPC legislation, intent to discriminate was evident in union contracts, job advertisements in newspapers (which often expressed a preference for “white” or “colored” workers), and payroll records. Norton also believed discrimination could be proved through “an employer’s pattern of rejections or statements made by personnel officers.”

The drive for a compulsory FEPC had begun in 1943 with the creation of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC. It consisted of unions, civil rights groups, and liberal religious organizations (primarily Jewish and Catholic) that supported the New Deal. Left-wing groups, such as the Socialist and Communist Parties, also favored a compulsory FEPC. Few Republicans or conservative organizations were involved, although Senator Arthur Capper (R-Kans.) was an honorary cochair with Senator Robert Wagner (D-N.Y.), a longtime labor ally. The council wished to make permanent the temporary FEPC created in 1941 by Roosevelt’s executive order. The wartime FEPC had inspired civil rights reformers to question the status quo and look to federal authority for assistance, but it opened few jobs for African Americans.

Reformers believed results would be different under a permanent, compulsory FEPC. Decades of moral suasion had been found wanting, according to A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (an African American union). Randolph believed that employers mouthed pious phrases about opportunity but then failed to act. For him, protest and pressure mattered more than talk. Recent employment gains among African Americans had come largely from the enormous demand for wartime labor, and reformers feared blacks would suffer extensive postwar job losses, as they had after World War I. A compulsory FEPC would minimize layoffs or ensure that they were made without regard to race.

Reformers also regarded a compulsory FEPC as part of a larger strug-
gle in which government would intervene in the employer-worker relationship to provide greater protections and wealth for labor. FEPC proponents drew inspiration from Roosevelt’s 1941 “Four Freedoms” speech, which included “freedom from want” as a basic right for all citizens. Freedom, they believed, had a material component. This contrasted sharply with Taft’s definition of freedom as the ability to live with minimal government regulation.¹⁰

Taft had other differences with compulsory FEPC advocates. The senator was convinced that few people understood the radical implications of a compulsory FEPC. The agency would be “bound by no rules of evidence,” he claimed, thus allowing government to run roughshod over business. Whereas compulsory FEPC proponents insisted that discrimination was relatively easy to discern, Taft found it a nebulous concept, especially in a legal setting. How did one prove that an employment decision was based on discrimination rather than on a job candidate’s qualifications or the lack thereof? Noting that anyone who failed to get a job or a promotion could claim to be a victim of discrimination, Taft feared there would be “thousands of lawsuits” against employers. He postulated that an employer could avoid these “harassing suits” only by “[choosing] his employees approximately in proportion to the division of races and religions in his district.” Warning that “race and religion will enter into every decision,” the senator foresaw a world in which “Catholic institutions . . . will have to employ Protestants” and “white waiters and porters could insist upon most of the work in the Pullman sleepers and dining cars.” Taft believed that mixing people who did not want to be mixed would lead to “more bad racial and religious feeling” and would “do the colored race more harm than good.”¹¹

The senator was especially worried that federal efforts would provoke violence. “You can pass some legislation, but if you go forward too quickly, reaction will set in,” he had told the Afro-American (a black newspaper chain) in May 1944. “When you pass some laws you are liable to run into race riots.” Taft saw prejudice as a fundamental part of human nature that had “existed from the beginning of time” and would “likely continue to exist.” Change was not impossible, but it required a soft approach and would come slowly.¹²

Taft was undoubtedly referring to the considerable racial conflict that
had occurred in both the North and the South. Most whites wanted to keep African Americans out of their neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. Riots had broken out in Harlem and Detroit, but smaller racial clashes also occurred. In March 1943, 2,000 women at a rubber plant in Detroit walked off the job to protest plans for integrated bathrooms. Two months later, white dockworkers in Mobile, Alabama, attacked blacks after hearing that twelve of them would be promoted to welders; the melee occurred even though the African Americans would be kept segregated.\(^\text{13}\)

A year later, 8,000 white workers at the Philadelphia Transit Company brought public transportation to a halt when they went on strike to protest management’s decision—made under pressure from the FEPC and other federal agencies—to hire eight blacks as motormen and conductors. Claiming they were being discriminated against, whites saw federal intervention on behalf of blacks as a threat to their job security. White and black leaders in Philadelphia worked feverishly to avoid violence; there were a few incidents, but no widespread rioting. Alarmed that war production at the city’s factories was suffering, federal officials brought in troops to run the streetcars, trolleys, and buses. The union went back to work after five days. This and other “hate strikes,” which occurred in Detroit, Portland, and elsewhere, were the latest incidents in a long history of workplace conflict between blue-collar whites and blacks outside the South.\(^\text{14}\)

Taft’s 1945 proposal meant that a compulsory FEPC had no chance of being enacted. Reformers had hoped to build a coalition of Republicans and nonsouthern Democrats, but GOP support was now unlikely. Senate convention held that legislators followed their leaders’ wishes. A lawmaker won a pork-barrel project, gained a seat on a desired committee, or rallied votes for a piece of legislation by toeing the party line. Mavericks found themselves ostracized; they could deliver speeches but little else for their constituents.\(^\text{15}\)

Activists were angry with Taft for other reasons. They believed bold government action would reduce racial tension and prevent violence. Members of the Cincinnati branch of the NAACP charged the senator with betraying earlier positions as well as the GOP’s 1944 platform pledge; Taft vigorously denied both allegations. The senator’s warning
about proportional hiring, they protested, was not only factually incorrect but also “a deliberate attempt to incite misinformed opposition.” Discussion of fair employment practices as a zero-sum game in which blacks gained jobs at whites’ expense had to be squashed.  

Reformers were especially troubled by Taft’s comments, offered to civil rights representatives during a private meeting on February 2, that blacks should be pleased with their progress and should not demand jobs where they were not wanted. Accusing him of “temporizing and indulging prejudice,” they pointedly asked him in a follow-up letter, “Did it ever occur to you that all Negroes are not satisfied with being porters and waiters, and that some might desire to be train engineers, but for racial discrimination, which bars them?” Roy Wilkins, editor of the NAACP’s journal *The Crisis*, suspected that Taft did not understand the extent of discrimination. He told the senator that study of the issue was “far behind the times because all Negroes, even illiterate ones, are cognizant that discrimination exists” and believe “persuasion is of no avail.” Enforcement powers were essential, Wilkins added, because African Americans had neither the time nor the money to file private lawsuits and wait for the courts to act.  

The NAACP put the onus for change squarely on the GOP. “The hatchet is out and it is not in the hands of [southern Democrats] . . . but in the aristocratic fingers of the distinguished senator from Ohio,” *The Crisis* editorialized. Unless the GOP backed a compulsory FEPC, “Negroes cannot do other than consider the Republicans unfriendly to their basic necessity of earning a living.” The NAACP was officially nonpartisan, although its leaders had established close ties with several nonsouthern Democrats in the 1930s. Taft’s relationship with the national organization was chilly at best; in 1944 he had denounced “the NAACP Communists” who had “sold themselves to the New Deal.”  

Few Republicans proved willing to support an FEPC. GOP members of the House Rules Committee cooperated with southern Democrats to block Norton’s compulsory FEPC bill. Nearly all legislation in the House required approval from the committee to be eligible for debate by the full body. Norton filed a discharge petition in April, but by December, just 50 of the 190 House Republicans had signed it. The petition remained roughly 50 signatures short of the 218 needed to pry the bill
from the committee. Republicans in both the House and the Senate, meanwhile, allied with southern Democrats to pass legislation that ended funding for the wartime FEPC beyond June 30, 1946.19

Southern Democrats launched a filibuster when a compulsory FEPC measure came up in the Senate in February 1946, bringing the upper house to a standstill. The filibuster and the reaction to it represented a test of lawmakers’ determination to pass or defeat a bill. Two options existed for ending a filibuster. Leaders could try to wear out participants by keeping the Senate in session around the clock, but members of both parties considered this taboo because so many legislators were quite elderly. The other alternative was cloture, by which two-thirds of those present and voting could halt the debate. The Senate had adopted cloture in just four of the twenty-one attempts since Rule XXII, the filibuster rule, had been implemented in 1917; it had never been achieved on a civil rights bill. Cloture failed this time, too—by eight votes. Although twenty-five Republicans voted for cloture, eight opposed it, and five did not vote.20

A vote for cloture was not a vote for a compulsory FEPC. A senator could favor ending the debate but then vote against the bill itself. Wilkins accused both parties of timidity. “The record made by the Republicans is nothing about which the party can boast,” he wrote to Republican National Committee (RNC) chair Herbert Brownell Jr. The Crisis insisted the compulsory measure would have passed if the White House and congressional Republicans had wanted it.21

Battles over an FEPC occurred regularly over the next several years. Several northern Democrats pushed for a compulsory body, and Harry Truman, who became president when Roosevelt died in April 1945, offered rhetorical support. Though Truman privately harbored racist views, he believed in equal opportunity, was sincerely troubled by violence against African Americans, and recognized that blacks constituted a core Democratic constituency. The president did little to prod congressional Democrats to act, however.22

Since the days of slavery, southern Democrats had fought diligently to keep federal authority out of the region’s labor market. They had blunted the impact of New Deal labor and social welfare legislation, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Social Security Act, by demanding provisions that limited the laws’ applicability to blacks or excluded them
altogether. Eager to preserve their region’s low-wage, racially hierarchi-
cal labor structure, southern Democrats filled the Congressional Record
with sharp denunciations of an FEPC.\textsuperscript{23}

Republicans spoke far less frequently, but what they said revealed im-
portant beliefs about race and American society. A few Republicans en-
donced a compulsory FEPC. Senator Wayne Morse (R-Ore.) had seen
discrimination firsthand while serving on the War Labor Board during
the early 1940s. Born in Wisconsin, Morse stood squarely in the tradition
of Robert La Follette, the state’s early-twentieth-century progressive
Republican governor and senator. Morse displayed a fierce independence
throughout his career. During the 1946 filibuster, he urged Senate leaders
to demand around-the-clock sessions. Soon after cloture failed, he pub-
licly condemned the “legislative tyranny of a willful minority.” Out of
step with most of his GOP colleagues on labor, race, and several other is-
issues, Morse became a Democrat in the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{24}

Irving Ives of New York was another Republican champion of a com-
pulsory FEPC. Before being elected to the Senate in 1946, he had been
chair of the New York Temporary Commission against Discrimination
and had led the successful struggle in 1945 for a compulsory FEPC in the
Empire State. A former insurance and banking executive, Ives was the
founding dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations at Cornell University. He personified a new perspective in
management theory—one that was less hostile toward government and
looked to promote more harmonious labor-management relations. “The
right to earn a living regardless of one’s race or religion or national origin
or ancestry is inherent in our American Creed,” he proclaimed. Ives’s
language reflected the influence of Gunnar Myrdal’s famous 1944 book
An American Dilemma. Myrdal posited that the gap between the na-
tion’s ideals of freedom and opportunity and the realities of racial op-
pression could be overcome, primarily through enlightened leadership
from elites. Throughout his twelve-year Senate career, Ives regularly
worked with liberal Democrats, most notably Senator Hubert Humphrey
(Minn.), on the FEPC and other civil rights matters.\textsuperscript{25}

Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) also advocated a compulsory FEPC. Elected to
the House in 1946, he served three terms. After a brief stint as attorney
general of the Empire State, he was elected to the Senate in 1956 and re-
mained there until 1981. A Jew who strongly believed that government could help the less fortunate, Javits might well have been a Democrat. However, he saw the Democrats as a southern-based party that oppressed blacks, favored the prohibition of alcohol, and was hostile to immigrants; the latter two positions were decidedly unpopular on the Lower East Side of New York City, where Javits grew up. The rampant corruption in the city’s Tammany Hall political machine, which Democrats controlled, also pushed Javits into the GOP.26

The New York FEPC stood as a source of pride for proponents of a compulsory federal FEPC. In 1947 Ives proclaimed it a success because none of the 752 allegations of discrimination it had investigated in the past year had wound up in court; all had been either settled amicably through negotiation or dismissed. For Ives, this was powerful evidence that claims that an FEPC would foster discord were erroneous. Over the next three decades, liberals in both parties would similarly portray the North as making racial progress through enlightened public policy.27

Whereas Taft and other critics of a compulsory FEPC regarded Nazi Germany as a dramatic reminder of the dangers of a powerful state, advocates drew different lessons from the war. According to Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-N.J.), blacks had proved themselves in the military and deserved equal opportunities in the postwar era. Noting Hitler’s theories of white supremacy, he asked, “Shall we find that while we have conquered this false ideology by force of arms, we have ourselves been overcome by this same false thinking?” The United States could win the allegiance of nonwhites, who made up two-thirds of the world’s population, by promoting equal opportunity and living up to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. Smith saw these issues in terms of American exceptionalism. “Is not equality of opportunity the eternal truth that America, the New World, has given to the Old World?” he asked. Racial or ethnic hatred, and the violence that might result, took on new meaning in a world where atom bombs existed. “We have come to a new age of human history,” Smith announced, “where tolerance and the goal of human understanding must be our objective if the human race is to survive.”28

These were minority views, advocated by only a handful of lawmakers who stood on the margins of power within the GOP and Congress. Most Republicans wanted no FEPC whatsoever. Some regarded it as an