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Burma. Map by Daniel W. Telles
Acknowledgments

First I need to thank my family for their support over the long hours. My wife, Mary, my son, Jackson, and my daughters, Emily and Laurel, allowed me the time to write. My parents, Roger and Shirley Sacquety, encouraged my study of history from day one. And my grandfather, Chester Wilson, a WWII and Korea veteran, inspired my love of history.

The OSS veterans and their family members have been invaluable. OSS veteran Elizabeth McIntosh and Detachment 101 members Marje Luce and Sam Spector got me started. Oliver Trechter, Allen Richter, Dennis Klein, Brian Ferry, Zach and Agnes Ebaugh, Walter Mess, Danny Mudrinich, Elton Archer, Oscar Milton, Sam Schreiner, Harvey Sussman, Herb Auerbach, Peter Lutken, Bud Banker, Carl Eifler, Red Ryder, Glenn Moehring, Paula Helfrich, Joe Lazarsky, Rich Kranstover, Dick Hamada, Ace Ellis, Blain Hedrick, Jim Ward, John Breen, Bernard Brophy, and Penny Hicks provided much material. Art Reinhardt, Caesar Civitella, Andy Mousalimas, Art Frizzell, and John Hamblet also provided support and advice along the way. V-Force veteran James Fletcher provided much information on that unit.

I wish to thank my colleagues who at one time or another helped as well: Michael Krivdo, Kenn Finlayson, Charles H. Briscoe, Jared Tracy, Dan Telles, Laura Goddard, Pedro Feliciano, Alejandro Lujan, Earl Moniz, Betty Rucker, Toni Hiley, and Carolyn Rheams. At the National Archives I would have been lost without the steadfast help of archivists Timothy Nenninger and the late John Taylor. A giant thank you goes to Larry MacDonald, who was a guiding hand for years. I also want to thank historians John Chambers, Patrick O’Donnell, Mark Van Rhyn, and Joey Dujon for their support. In particular, I want to thank my mentor Brian M. Linn, without whom this project would have never started. Lastly, I need to thank R. P., J. P., J. P. J., and J. B., without whom I could never have kept focused enough to put pen to paper. You were literally there from start to finish. Thank you!
Commonly Used Acronyms

AFL  Burmese Anti-Fascist League
AFU  Arakan Field Unit
ALFSEA Allied Land Forces South East Asia
AOR  area of responsibility
ATC  Air Transport Command
CAS  British Civil Affairs Service
CBI  China-Burma-India Theater
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CIC  U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps
CIT  combat interrogation team
CMA  Citation for Military Assistance
COI  Coordinator of Information
FEU  Field Experimental Unit
I&R  intelligence and reconnaissance
LARU Lambertsen amphibious respiratory unit
LCR  landing craft, rubber
MO  OSS Morale Operations Branch
MU  Maritime Unit Branch
NCAC Northern Combat Area Command
OCNA Office of the Coordinator of Native Affairs
OCS  Officer Candidate School
OG  OSS Operational Group
OSS  Office of Strategic Services
OWI  Office of War Information
POW  prisoner of war
RAF  Royal Air Force
R&A  OSS Research and Analysis Branch
R&D  OSS Research and Development Branch
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACO</td>
<td>Sino-American Cooperative Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Special Action Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA/G</td>
<td>Special Activities, Goodfellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>special counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAC</td>
<td>British-led South East Asia Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>OSS Secret Intelligence Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>OSS Special Operations Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>British Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>U.S. Army Services of Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>OSS Strategic Services Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSU</td>
<td>Strategic Services Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;T</td>
<td>OSS Schools and Training Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO&amp;E</td>
<td>table of organization and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAAF</td>
<td>United States Army Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-2</td>
<td>OSS Counter-Intelligence Branch</td>
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OSS Detachment 101’s missions with Merrill’s Marauders from the Hukawng Valley to Myitkyina, 24 February–27 May, 1944. Map by Daniel W. Telles
Introduction

I disliked intensely the prospect of a large-scale campaign in Northern Burma. One could not choose a worse place for fighting the Japanese. . . . But, we never succeeded in deflecting the Americans from their purpose. . . . We of course wanted to recapture Burma, but we did not want to do it by land advances from slender communications and across the most forbidding fighting country imaginable.

Winston S. Churchill

Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) holds the distinction of being the only OSS unit whose operations were a key component and integral to the conduct of its theater’s overall campaign. In part because of its organizational adaptability and unique operational environment, perhaps more than any other unit, Detachment 101 fulfilled OSS director William J. Donovan’s image of clandestine units that aided conventional operations through intelligence collection and sabotage. Of the American ground forces that served in north Burma, Detachment 101 entered the field first and left it last. Along the way, Detachment 101 assisted both American ground and air units and several Chinese and British elements with intelligence or screening actions, essentially performing a role in north Burma that covered the conduct of the entire campaign. For its superb performance, the OSS itself assessed Detachment 101 as its “most effective combat tactical force.” The OSS went further, adding that Detachment 101 “may well come to be recognized as a model for subversive operations under the same or analogous conditions” and that the original members of Detachment 101 were pioneers “in a type of operation which may well become a classic of modern warfare.” Detachment 101’s operations were also extremely complex. When the OSS History Office looked to write the story of Detachment 101, some of its historians
“suspect[ed] the 101 history is at all odds the most complicated of the several detachments.”¹⁴ In part because it fought in the relative backwater of Burma and OSS European operations overshadowed it, Detachment 101 has been unappreciated and previously not received an academic study.

Detachment 101 was one of the first elements formed under the OSS predecessor, the Coordinator of Information (COI). The unit arrived in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater in mid-1942 and did not disband until mid-1945. These three years of service in one theater not only allowed Detachment 101 to master the geographical and human terrain in its operational area, but also gave it the longest period of service in any one general locale of any OSS unit. This helped the unit achieve an operational maturity unseen in other theaters.

In a classic unconventional warfare campaign, by mid-1944 Detachment 101 went through what Donovan saw as the three phases of a typical insurgency: infiltration and preparation, sabotage and subversion, and finally guerrilla support to aid conventional units.⁵ However, Detachment 101’s flexible nature allowed a unique fourth phase: by mid-1945 Detachment 101’s guerrillas comprised the only U.S.-led ground combat element in Burma. Detachment 101’s path through these phases was not easy, direct, or even intentional. However, the unit’s inherent flexibility, due to the situation, lack of resources, and hands-off approach from upper-level commands, allowed Detachment 101’s two commanders to mold it into an organization that reflected their personalities.

In late 1942 Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, the U.S. commander in north Burma, told Detachment 101’s first commanding officer, Major Carl F. Eifler, “You have ninety days for me to hear booms from the jungle.”⁶ Yet, Detachment 101 had no historical operational or organizational model to follow. In addition, once it was in the Far East, Detachment 101 received almost no direction from Donovan and little other than general guidance from Stilwell. Therefore, the men of Detachment 101 had to envision what the unit was to do and then mold it into one capable of handling a myriad of missions. Eifler, bold and impetuous, forged the group into one that believed it could accomplish any task—even if it could not. He focused on high-risk ventures that had the potential to produce dramatic results.

When Detachment 101’s far-reaching gambits proved unworkable, Colonel William R. Peers, the second commander, adjusted the unit’s mission to that of conducting an unconventional warfare campaign revolving around aggressive intelligence collection and use of indigenous guerrillas to support a long-term north Burma campaign. Through this change in mis-
The unit was so successful that Detachment 101 received a Presidential Unit Citation, one of the few awarded to any specific OSS element, for its later role in conventional-style combat operations in Burma’s Shan States. This alone reflects on Detachment 101’s ability to adopt new missions.

To succeed through its developmental stages, Detachment 101 adopted an operational structure and role unique even in the unconventional OSS. From a fledgling unit of only twenty-one soldiers in 1942, the unit’s guerrilla forces grew to the size equivalent of a light division. As such, Detachment 101 undertook numerous and sometimes noncomplementary missions and had to constantly add to its support elements and adapt its operational structure to meet the changing strategic situation. The structure, mission, and scope of Detachment 101 makes it, in hindsight, a forerunner of the type of operations conducted by today’s Special Forces, even if the unit, or even the OSS in general, is not officially recognized in the lineage of any U.S. Army element.

In more modern terms, Detachment 101 functioned much like a Special Action Force (SAF), such as the Eighth SAF in Panama and the First SAF in Okinawa in the 1960s, where capabilities such as Special Forces, civil affairs, special operations support, and psychological operations personnel were closely integrated within one unit. In this regard, Detachment 101 functioned as a combined and joint operations taskforce with its own air, naval, and ground forces, and a multinational complement, all under its control. But operating in Burma was itself complicated.

The American campaign in Burma was one of the most poorly resourced of all operational theaters in WWII and at the end of one of the longest logistics trails of the entire war. Compounded by the difficult operational environment, this meant that the few American ground combat forces that fought in north Burma, Merrill’s Marauders and the MARS Task Force, were purposely formed, organized, trained, and equipped to deal with the unique challenges of combat in that theater. Burma was a British colony, and that nation had command supremacy; however, American strategy in the North Burma Campaign centered on keeping China in the war. The Japanese had occupied China’s major ports since 1938. This left China with only a tenuous and lengthy overland route called the Burma Road to support its forces with American-supplied aid. With their invasion of Burma early in 1942, the Japanese managed to sever even this link.

With the Burma Road under enemy control, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) established airfields in Assam, India, to fly cargo aircraft via the hazardous “Hump” air-bridge through the dangerous Himalayan
mountain passes to China. This endeavor was costly in terms of aircraft, cargos, and crews. As a preferred alternative, U.S. planners decided to construct a land route from India to bypass the original Burma Road. Beginning in December 1942, U.S. Army engineers undertook construction on the Ledo Road from upper Assam in India, to cut across north Burma and eventually link up with the path of the original Burma Road at Lashio, Burma. The new route would allow the United States to more efficiently supply the Chinese war effort, which in turn tied down a large part of the Japanese army that would otherwise be available to fight American troops. The North Burma Campaign centered on securing this route, and Detachment 101 played a prominent if unheralded role.

What follows is a study of the operations and organization of Detachment 101. While veterans’ memoirs detail what the unit did, this is the first to describe how they accomplished their task. Detachment 101’s operations were exceedingly complicated and, though centered in north Burma, involved operations in at least five countries. Therefore, this study does not cover every individual mission or facet of Detachment 101, only those most crucial to the overall story. Because the organization and function of headquarters elements occurred hundreds of miles away and in a virtual vacuum from operations, this study covers the two aspects separately. Detachment 101’s constant reorganizations, attention to support elements, and means of incorporating separate OSS functions into its operational matrix were the critical link to sustaining field operations. But first, one has to understand Burma: its peoples, terrain, weather, and history that led up to American involvement there in WWII.
This is Burma, and it will be quite unlike any land that one knows about.

Rudyard Kipling, *Letters from the East*

American soldiers fighting the Japanese in north Burma in WWII experienced the accuracy of Kipling’s quote. There, they discovered a wild land about which they knew almost nothing. However, it was not as magical as Kipling made it out to be. North Burma was not a far-flung land filled with romantic adventure. It was a disease-plagued, monsoon-drenched jungle where dangerous creatures abounded. Set in the steep foothills of the Himalayas, the area of operations made for some of the most challenging and wide-ranging terrain ever fought over.

Roughly the size of Texas, Burma has much greater geographical extremes. To the south along the Indian Ocean is the capital city of Rangoon, now called Yangon. Above Rangoon, the swampy mangrove-lined coast along the Bay of Bengal is the Arakan (now Rakhine State). North from the coast, the terrain is increasingly rugged. The humid subtropical foothills of the Himalayas—often several thousands of feet high—begin in the Kachin hill tracts just past Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. Rolling jungle-covered hills immediately become small steep mountains that increase in size and elevation to the north. It was in this location that Detachment 101 operated. Detachment 101 chronicled an example of the difficulty in moving over this terrain in an early 1944 report: “Tilly got lost in the high grass, had to part the grass and fall on it . . . slashed his arms and trouser legs. He then got to the top of a hill and climbed a tree. He got nearly to the crotch and got his hand caught in a bee hive . . . started off through the pit grass. He went right over the cliff 30 feet.”

1
Throughout all this terrain flow several major rivers that bisect the headlands into steep valleys. These rivers, from the west to east, are the Chindwin, the Irrawaddy, the Shweli, and the Salween. The Chindwin flows through the wild Hukawng Valley before joining the Irrawaddy. The longest and most important river in Burma is the Irrawaddy. Formed by the confluence of the N’mai and Mali rivers to the north of the Kachin capital of Myitkyina, it continues south to flow through the strategic cities of north Burma—Myitkyina, Bhamo, and Mandalay—before finally entering the Indian Ocean in a delta that includes Rangoon. Farther east is the Shweli. The major river that is farthest to the east is the Salween. Unlike the others, it is not a tributary to the Irrawaddy. The Salween flows from China, along the border with Thailand, before finally entering the Andaman Sea. Each of these rivers flows through areas inhabited by north Burma’s major ethnic groups.

Internally, Burma was hardly unified then, nor is it now. The region encompasses speakers of more than a hundred languages, more than a hundred separate ethnicities, and followers of Christianity, Islam, animism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Even today insurgencies fueled by ethnic discord plague Burma. For instance, the ongoing Karen struggle for independence started in 1949, soon after Burma’s independence from the United Kingdom. The ethnic groups that played the largest roles in Detachment 101 and U.S. Army operations in north Burma were the Burmans, and above all, the Kachin.

The Burmans are the largest and most dominant ethnic group. In WWII they inhabited the most populous areas in southern Burma, made up some 70 percent of Burma’s total population, and were predominantly Buddhist. The history of Britain’s domination of Burma revolved around this group. In the nineteenth century, British forces in India fought three wars against the Burmans. The first Anglo-Burmese War, in 1824–1826, resulted in the Burmese ceding parts of the country, including the Arakan, to British administration. The second Anglo-Burmese War, from 1852 to 1853, further strengthened the British position. The final and third Anglo-Burmese War, from 1885 to 1887, resulted in British domination and annexation of the entire country.

Although there were occasional minor revolts, until 1937, the British administered Burma relatively peacefully as part of India. However, this was an arbitrary administrative pairing as the two countries have little in common with the exception of certain border areas. Only in 1938 did the British begin governing Burma as a separate colony. The Burmans, however, never forgot their independence nor gave complete loyalty to the British crown. From their ranks sprang a fifth column that would have an active role in the
Japanese invasion and after the war. The story was different in the northern hill tracts.

Despite a reputation of being fiercely independent and ungovernable, the hill tribes of Burma proved to be the most pro-British. This stance assisted the Allies and particularly Detachment 101. There were four main reasons for Kachin loyalty. First was the decades of effort made by British civil administrators before the war. In order to help govern the area, the civil administrators allowed the hill tribes to continue their traditional forms of government, and even encouraged the people to rely on their headmen and councils. Second, the Kachins had a militaristic tradition. The British had taken advantage of the ethnic buffer provided by the Kachins between the Burmans and the Chinese and recruited heavily among the tough warrior culture to guard the frontier. Third, regional politics also played a role. Those in the hill tribes were sandwiched between much larger populations of Chinese to the north and Burmans to the south. To many in the hill tribes, the British occupation was ideal. That empire could not exert too much influence in the Kachin home areas, yet it was powerful enough to keep the Burmans and Chinese in check. Fourth, in contrast to the Buddhist south, Christianity had taken hold in the hill tracts. Although many Kachins were animists, Baptist and Catholic missionaries brought their religion into the area and developed rapport. Decades of effort put forth by missionaries paved the way for cooperation. American missionaries had adapted the spoken language, Jinghpaw, into written form. The goodwill of the American missionaries had impressed the Kachins and assisted cooperation with Detachment 101 when it arrived in 1942.

Although other ethnic groups such as the Nagas, Palaungs, and Shans were present in north Burma, by far the most important ethnic group to the Allies was the Kachin. Also known as Jinghpaw, “Kachin” is an umbrella term describing several ethnic groups in north Burma and parts of neighboring China. In the Kachin, Detachment 101 had the fortune of finding a warlike and willing ally. The Kachin were far more primitive than the Burmans to the south. They lived in small villages composed of wood and bamboo shacks, or bashas. Near and in these villages the Kachin grew their staple crops of rice, beans, and corn, and raised chickens and pigs. The Kachin were also masters of junglecraft, giving them what seemed to the Americans as an almost superhuman power to read the jungle. Having grown up in a severe environment, they did not have great requirements, and they produced what little they needed, including gunpowder. The Kachin possessed incredible stamina and had an effortless capability to walk long distances...
over steep terrain while carrying heavy loads. The Kachin also knew the area’s numerous unmapped trails, and could easily bypass well-traveled roads. With these skills, the Kachin appeared and disappeared from the jungle at ease, proving to be a dangerous foe to the Japanese.

The Kachin were simply ideal guerrilla fighters. According to a 1943 OSS report, “a Kachin with a ‘dah’ [traditional knife] can be comparable to a whole panzer division in his own country.” Many of the Kachins had developed hunting skills from an early age. The Kachins did not fight fair as a Westerner would understand it; however, that was perfectly fine for Detachment 101. For instance, it was not an acceptable fighting practice to the Kachins to hold ground. Rather, hit-and-run ambushes were the norm.

Detachment 101 adapted well to this style of warfare. In a typical ambush, a Detachment 101 group would stake out a position along a road or trail and wait. When an enemy column arrived, a prearranged signal triggered the group to fire. At times, the burst was only long enough to make it through one magazine, or just enough time to throw a few grenades. There was no point in conserving ammunition, as the 101 group did not intend to make a stand, and could always be resupplied by air. Meanwhile, the Japanese often reacted by jumping to cover on the sides of the road or trail. Here they encountered another weapon in Detachment 101’s arsenal, the punji, which doubled as an outstanding psychological weapon. With the Japanese then reeling in confusion, the guerrillas melted back into the jungle. At this point, as one postwar depiction noted, “nobody covered anybody” as until they reached a prearranged rendezvous, it was “every man for himself.”

But why Detachment 101 had to fight in Burma deserves explanation.

The Fall of Burma

In addition to the native ethnic groups, Burma was a land of immigrants. Before the war, many Indians and Chinese saw Burma as a frontier for poor workers and entrepreneurs alike to make their fortunes. The immigrants flooded the country, and some created virtual monopolies among arenas of business, in which they would only hire their own. Resentment grew as the immigrants left the Burmans out of the potential economic gains and resultant jobs. By the time that the Japanese attacked in mid-January 1942 internal strife in the south had reached a high point.

At that time, the mood in British Burma was tense. The Japanese invasion came on the heels of a string of British defeats in Hong Kong, Malaya, and
Singapore. The Japanese also forced Thailand into an uneasy alliance and occupied that country.\textsuperscript{9} Burma, the gateway to India, was next. When the invasion came, the British did not just lose in Burma. They suffered utter defeat. It was a blow from which London would not recover even after the war, and it sowed the seed for Burma’s independence.\textsuperscript{10}

The Japanese cut across the Kra isthmus before venturing to Rangoon, with British and Commonwealth forces powerless to stop the advance. Eager to protect their “back door” and lifeline, Chinese forces entered the fray. In all, nine divisions crossed into Burma to protect the one supply route that China had left, the Burma Road. A small U.S. group under Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell arrived to assist, but like the Chinese, it was too late. He arrived just in time to retreat weeks later.\textsuperscript{11}

Stilwell led his small group on foot across the hills to India, arriving on 15 May 1942. Furiously, he said, “I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.”\textsuperscript{12} However, at the moment, Stilwell had little with which to accomplish this task. His main combat elements were portions of four Chinese divisions that had escaped to India. There, the United States retrained and reformed the Chinese as the X-Force. It provided the bulk of forces under American command in the north Burma campaign. The other Chinese troops retreated back into China proper. Commonwealth military units, although battered, had the discipline and support to make it to India with a semblance of order.

That was not true of Burma’s recent immigrant civilian population. Chaos ensued once the reality of a Japanese takeover was apparent to the civilian population. Thousands of non-Burmese refugees tried to make it to safety in India or China. They feared that they would not fare well under the Japanese. Perhaps the hardest hit were the Indians and the Anglo-Indian/Anglo-Burmese. At first, they tried to seek passage by sea. However, once Rangoon fell, the refugees had an even greater struggle to make it out.

The Chinese had it easiest. They ventured north up the Irrawaddy to Myitkyina, where they found transport to China. The Europeans, Indians, Anglo-Indians, and Anglo-Burmans were not so lucky. Despite Burma having long been administered as a part of India, no roads linked the two countries, only rudimentary trails. At first, the journey to India was easy. But soon, roads gave way to paths, forcing those lucky enough to have motor transportation to abandon their automobiles. Then, the rugged mountain passes turned into trails where villages—which offered rest, food, and shelter—were few and far between. Many of the refugees fled through north
Burma, up through the Hukawng Valley and through the steep mountain passes of the Naga hills to safety in Assam. Along the way, however, constant monsoon rains turned the jungle trails into quagmires. Lack of infrastructure, poor sanitation, and eventual disease and starvation led to thousands perishing along the trailside. It was one of the largest humanitarian plights of the era, but has long since been forgotten. As Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper describe in their excellent *Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941–1945*, “By the autumn of 1942 in the region of 600,000 people had fled from Burma into India by land and sea. Of these, as many as 80,000 may have perished of disease, exhaustion, or malnutrition.”

Although difficult, the terrain created a respite. As one American OSS officer later noted, the Japanese were so exhausted by the time they reached the mountain passes into India and so short of supplies that “their mad gallop across Thailand and the flat-lands of southern and central Burma slowed down to little more than a blind stagger at the India-Burma border.” Even two years later, American soldiers often came upon the bleached bones of the unfortunate who had not made it into India. It was a grisly greeting to Americans new to a strange land about which most knew nothing. The debacle of the so-called First Burma Campaign provided a preamble that Allied troops would soon come to know; Burma was one of the most debilitating environments in the Second World War for military operations because of the climate, terrain, and endemic diseases.

In this tropical country, temperatures in central Burma exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit from March through May. From June to September, the monsoon season takes hold with the constant moisture leading to rot, decay, and rust of most equipment. Eifler reported to OSS Washington in June 1943, “A cleaned pistol will develop rust pits in 24 hours, a pair of shoes not cleaned daily will rot in a week.” Leeches, mosquitoes, and accompanying diseases—such as malaria, typhus, and encephalitis—prevailed. In his memoir, *Defeat into Victory*, Field Marshall William J. Slim, commander of the British Fourteenth Army, discussed his force’s encounters with disease:

In 1943, for every man evacuated with wounds we had one hundred and twenty four evacuated sick. The annual malaria rate alone was eighty-four per cent annum of the total strength of the army and still higher for the forward troops. . . . At this time, the sick rate of men evacuated from their units rose to twelve thousand per day. A simple calculation showed me that in a matter of months at this rate my army would have melted away.”
Americans faced a similar situation in north Burma. In 1943, the rate of malaria in the CBI was 206 cases per 1,000 men per year. After much effort to combat the disease, by 1944 it had only dropped to 167 cases per 1,000 men per year. In special circumstances, the rate could become even higher. Merrill’s Marauders, for instance, suffered appalling rates of dysentery, malaria, and scrub typhus during their campaign to seize Myitkyina. By 4 June 1944, out of a force of approximately 3,000 men, they had suffered 1,220 Casualties from disease in contrast to 424 reported killed, wounded, or missing.\textsuperscript{17}

In just his first month operating in enemy occupied territory, OSS Detachment 101 medical officer Lieutenant Commander James C. Luce reported treating among the local population 103 cases of malaria, 16 of dysentery, 2 of tuberculosis, 16 of scabies, 4 of ringworm, 30 of tropical ulcers, and 27 of gonorrhea, in addition to numerous other ailments.\textsuperscript{18} And as another Detachment 101 officer discovered later, the jungle had additional dangers. After describing some of the venomous vipers, Elton Archer said:

Other varmints also inhabited the jungle floors; the most obnoxious ones were the elephant leeches, which attached themselves to a twig or branch in the path and elongated their bodies and tentacles; sensing the warmth of any human being who passed by, they could slither into an incredibly small space without being detected by their victim, and could attach themselves, even injecting an anesthetic fluid which kept their prey from knowing they were there. In order to get them off, when a person reached the end of a day’s march, he had to rub them with salt or touch the lighted end of a cigarette to them. If they were just pulled off, they left the proboscis in the victim and it would continue to fester and cause infection.\textsuperscript{19}

It was to this environment that the members of OSS Detachment 101 had to adjust, and even to thrive in it if they were to become successful in their operations in enemy-occupied territory. It was their job to further U.S. policy in regards to China.

With China now under complete blockage, the United States looked for a way to open up a corridor from which to supply their ally. With no overland route remaining, they did so by air. Aircraft flying the treacherous “Hump” route took off from airbases in India, flew over the Himalayas, and landed in China. Although the crews were incredibly brave and daring, the effort was wasteful, in terms of both aircraft and supplies. A second option had more merit.
From Ledo, India, a group of U.S. Army engineers began constructing an all-weather road over incredibly difficult terrain over which Detachment 101 estimated that it took a man thirty days to walk the same distance that a light plane could fly in one hour. Dubbed the “Ledo Road,” it was planned to link up with the original Burma Road below Myitkyina, and from there, to China. The trace of this new road, however, was in enemy hands. It was the task of the north Burma campaign to secure it, and Detachment 101 would spearhead the effort.