Presidential Control over Administration

"An insightful analysis of the cyclical dynamics inherent in presidential management of the macroeconomy."—Congress & the Presidency

“Much of our thinking about presidential power rests on the assumption of certain structural advantages that allow incumbents to amass information from the executive branch and seize the initiative in policymaking. Presidential Control Over Administration unravels these assumptions. O’Brien shows us an executive branch in which the presidency’s alleged advantages vary widely from one incumbent to the next and from one policy area to another. Looking specifically at public finance, he shows us that variations in presidential control are not random but recur in extended sequences. In explaining these patterns, he has taken presidential studies a big step forward.”—Stephen Skowronek, Pelatiah Perit Professor of Political and Social Science, Yale University, and author of Presidential Leadership in Political Time

“O’Brien’s book makes a very important argument about the centrality of presidential control of administration as a historical variable in explaining policy making variations. It improves upon the existing presidency literature, which does not take adequate account of this variable. In other words, the author pays due attention to the importance of the president’s executive team and how it has functioned under various presidents and how that difference affects policy. Previous work in this field simply does not do so and therefore this book should be considered path breaking. The author combines a complex and subtle understanding of public finance and public finance policymaking with a mastery of both the presidency and American political development fields of scholarship. He may well be unique in this combination of scholarly accomplishments.”—Marc Landy, professor, Boston College, and coauthor of Presidential Greatness