"I think it is the best book I've read on the last part of the Vietnam War."—Tom Ricks in Foreign Policy
“The finest account to date of American military and political policy from the aftermath of the Tet Offensive to the 'fall' of Saigon. This book should be considered required reading by all students of the American War in Vietnam, whether they are in the classroom, the newsroom, the sitting room, or the war room."—Journal of American History
“As Willbanks demonstrates, no expenditure of firepower, blood, or personal heroics can redeem flawed strategies and policies. . . . Willbanks effectively demonstrates that a flawed U.S. exit policy led to the raising of a Viet Cong flag over Saigon on April 29, 1975.”—Vietnam
“History is not supposed to repeat itself, but one is drawn to some sobering similarities between our current attempts to create a stable and secure Iraq and the legacy of the failed policy of Vietnamization.”—Parameters
“At a time when the United States once again finds itself trying to withdraw with honor from a foreign military entanglement, this book is an excellent read for the professional military officer, diplomat, politician, and academic who hope to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated.”—Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute
"Willbanks, a former U.S. military adviser who survived the 1972 battle of An Loc, has written what will be the best overview of the military and political situation in Vietnam in the post-Tet period. He has mastered the scholarship on the subject and recounts, in great detail, the Nixon administration's flailing attempts to achieve "peace with honor."—Journal of Cold War Studies
"One of the finest military histories to date of the final two stages of the Vietnam War: the period from the Tet Offensive in 1968 to the American withdrawal in 1972, and the bitter end game, 1972-1975. Why Vietnamization failed just two years after the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam on 29 March 1973 is the central question of the book. This is sobering tale told by balanced, exacting scholar. The level of Wilbanks' research not only meets the bar of most current scholarly publications, but exceeds it in many areas, especially his use of U.S. Army documents. Wilbanks carefully builds each of his major arguments with the best available evidence, and is careful to employ historiography from all sides of the political spectrum in making his case. One will find, for instance, quotations from Marxist scholars and U.S. Army generals in the same paragraph, making nearly identical observations about the war. In short, Wilbanks' history of the period along with Jeffrey J. Clarke's Advice and Support: The Final Years, 19651973 will stand out as a seminal account of the period for many years to come."
—International Journal of Naval History
"This fine book is highly recommended for history enthusiasts, military and governmental professionals, and general readers who want an unbiased view of a critical part of recent history."—On Point
"A must read for those interested in the Vietnam War. Essential."—Choice
“Easily surpasses previous books on the same period of the war. . . . An excellent and valuable addition to the history of the Vietnam War.”—Dale Andrade, author of America's Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi's 1972 Easter Offensive
“Provides valuable perspectives on the tenuous balance between political realities and military strategies. Required reading for students, scholars, strategists and military planners.”—Larry Berman, author of No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam
“A candid and convincing analysis of the failure of Vietnamization.”—David L. Anderson, editor of Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre
“Recommended to the scholar and to the general reader alike.”—William Duiker, author of Ho Chi Minh: A Life
