The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy
Essays in Law and History
Edited by David Gray Adler and Larry N. George
In this provocative and readable volume, eleven leading constitutional authorities challenge "business as usual" in American foreign policymaking. For far too long, they contend, Americans have acquiesced to presidential claims to sweeping executive powers in foreign affairs—thanks to imperial-minded presidents, a weak-willed Congress, and neglectful scholars.
These authors forcefully argue that the president is not the supreme crafter of foreign policy and that Congress must provide more than a rubber stamp for the president's agenda. Unilateral presidential control of foreign relations, they warn, can pose a grave threat to our nation's welfare and is simply without constitutional warrant.
“an extremely useful, insightful and well-writen volume.”
—Law and Politics Book Review
“An excellent scholarly compendium of 14 essays focusing on the wide gulf that has developed in the last 60 years between constitutional principle and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign affairs.”
—Foreign AffairsSee all reviews...
“Will be of significant use to those interested in the interaction between the branches with respect to foreign policy and the constitutional arguments that surround it.”
—American Politics Review
“The authors of the 14 articles in this cohesive collection propose that executive domination of American foreign policy has become so pervasive as to threaten the constitutional balance between the president and Congress.”
“These provocative essays on the delicate partnership of Congress and the president are must reading for members of Congress, presidents, presidential advisers, and all serious students of American constitutionalism.”
—Thomas E. Cronin, author of The State of the Presidency
“A well-conceived and impressive book that will be useful for both scholars and general readers.”
—Jules Lobel, lead attorney in Dellums v. Bush
“An important contribution to the growing body of literature on separate and shared national security powers in our democracy.”
—Stephen Dycus, coauthor of National Security LawSee fewer reviews...
Combining constitutional theory with keen historical insights, these authors illuminate the roots of presidential abuse of executive power and remind us of the past and potential costs of such disregard for our unique system of checks-and-balances. An essential guide for all concerned citizens and members of Congress, this volume should help revive a proper understanding of this crucial dimension of American democracy.